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SPRECHER v. ADAMSON COMPANIES: NONFEASANCE
IMMUNITY SLIDES BY THE CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT
I.

INTRODUCTION

Tort law has traditionally refused to assign liability to an owner or
occupier of land on whose property a natural condition exists which
causes damage to an adjoining landowner.' The common law has instead reserved liability for the situation in which an artfcial condition
causes the damage.2 The distinction between artificial and natural conditions developed as an embodiment of the broader distinction between
misfeasance and nonfeasance.3 Misfeasance exists when a defendant's
conduct creates a risk of harm to the plaintiff, or aggravates the danger
posed by an already existing risk of harm.4 Nonfeasance, on the other
hand, exists when the risk of harm has been created independently of
the defendant's conduct.5
1. See W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 354-56 (1971) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 363 (1965) for a statement of the natural condition immunity rule and citations to
cases applying it.
2. A "natural condition" is one that
has not been changed by any act of a human being, whether by the possessor or
any of his predecessors in possession, or a third person dealing with the land either
with or without the consent of the possessor. It is also used to include the natural
growth of trees, weeds and other vegetation upon land not artificially made receptive to them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 363 comment (b) (1965). An "artificial condition" is

any structure erected upon the land as well as "trees or plants planted or preserved, and
changes in the surface by excavation or filling, irrespective of whether they are harmful in
themselves or become so only because of the subsequent operation of natural forces." Id
3. See Noel, Nuisancesfrom Land in its Natural Condition, 56 HARV. L. REv. 772
(1943):
[T]raditionally the common law has not imposed on one man any obligation to
take affirmative steps for the protection of others, and that the duty of a person in
possession of land to exercise reasonable care to prevent it from causing harm to
others never has arisen out of possession or ownership alone, but only out of some
particular use of the property, as where he erects a structure and fails to keep it in a
safe condition.
Id at 773 (citing F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN TORTS 47 (1926)).
4. See Weinrib, The Casefor a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 256 (1980). It does
not matter that the defendant's conduct is completely innocent-if it creates the risk of
harm, it is nonetheless misfeasance. Id
5. Id. "Participation by the defendant in the creation of the risk, even if such participation is innocent, is thus the crucial factor in distinguishing misfeasance from nonfeasance."
Id
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Until recently, California courts observed this distinction.6 In
Sprecher v. Adamson Companies,7 however, the California Supreme
Court departed radically from the common law rule of natural condi-

tion immunity. The Sprecher court imposed an affirmative duty on
landowners to manage their property reasonably, invalidating the distinction between artificial and natural conditions as a basis for determining liability.8
The Sprecher holding raised significant questions with respect to

the recognition of nonfeasance liability. This note will examine the issues of nonfeasance and misfeasance raised by the Sprecher facts and
will analyze the reasoning used by the court to reach its conclusion.

This note will also explore the rationale for the recognition and denial
of nonfeasance tort immunity. It will conclude that the Sprecher court
failed to establish a principled basis for abrogating the misfeasance-

nonfeasance distinction.
II.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The defendants, Adamson Companies and Century-Malibu Ventures, Inc., owned a 90-acre parcel of land in Malibu, California. A

portion of this land contained an active landslide which was discovered

in the early part of this century. 9 The plaintiff, Peter Sprecher, owned
one of several beach front homes immediately downhill and across a

road from the defendants' land. In March 1978, heavy rains precipitated a major movement along the landslide area on defendants' property, causing plaintiff's house to move and press against the house of
his neighbor, Gwendolyn Sexton.' ° Sexton filed suit against plaintiff
seeking injunctive relief from this encroachment." Plaintiff cross-complained against Sexton, the County of Los Angeles, and the defendants.
In his cross-complaint, plaintiff sought damages from defendants for
harm done to his house. He claimed that defendants had negligently
6. See Wisher v. Fowler, 7 Cal. App. 3d 225, 86 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1970) (triable issue of
fact existed whether hedge that allegedly obstructed plaintiff decedent's view of highway and
resulted in his death was artificial or natural); Coates v. Chinn, 51 Cal. 2d 304, 332 P.2d 289
(1958) (tree from which branch had fallen resulting in plaintiff's injury was artificial condition, and thus ordinary negligence principles would govern case); Boarts v. Imperial Irrigation Dist., 80 Cal. App. 2d 574, 182 P.2d 246 (1947) (growth of weeds on defendant's
property was natural condition and defendant therefore owed no duty to cut the weeds to
prevent crop damage to plaintiffs adjoining property).
7. 30 Cal. 3d 358, 636 P.2d 1121, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1981).
8. Id at 371, 636 P.2d at 1128, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
9. Id at 360-61, 636 P.2d at 1121-22, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 783-84.
10. Id
11. Id
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failed to correct or control the natural landslide condition which existed on their property. 2 All parties to the action agreed that human
activity had played no part in the land movement that caused the
13
damage.
The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment
and the court of appeal affirmed. 14 The California Supreme Court
unanimously reversed,' 5 imposed a duty of care on the defendants to
manage their property reasonably, and remanded the case for determination of whether the defendants had breached this new duty.16
III.

REASONING OF THE COURT

The Sprecher court recognized that the distinction between artificial and natural conditions was rooted in the principle that "mere nonfeasance" is not actionable. 7 The court rejected this principle,'"
reasoning that possession of land "with its attendant right to control
conditions on the premises is a sufficient basis for the imposition of an
affirmative duty to act."' 9 The court dismissed the nonfeasance underpinning of natural condition immunity by declaring that "[w]hatever
the rule may once have been, it is now clear that a duty to exercise due
12. Id
13. Id

14. Sprecher v. Adamson Cos., 114 Cal. App. 3d 386, 170 Cal. Rptr. 702, vacated, 30
Cal. 3d 358, 636 P.2d 1121, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1981).
15. 30 Cal. 3d 358, 636 P.2d 1121, 178 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1981). Justice Richardson wrote a
separate concurring opinion. He agreed with the majority that the artificial-natural condition distinction should be abandoned and a duty imposed on landowners in every case when
a condition on their land caused injury, but questioned whether, under the circumstances of
the Sprecher case, any restraining engineering procedures could reasonably be required of
the landowners. 30 Cal. 3d at 374, 636 P.2d at 1130, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 792 (Richardson, J.,
concurring).
16. 30 Cal. 3d at 373, 636 P.2d at 1130, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 792.
17. Id at 367, 636 P.2d at 1126, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 788. The rule is stated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965): "The fact that the actor realizes or should realize
that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of itself impose
upon him a duty to take such action." The origin of the rule is historic; early courts were
concerned primarily with flagrant forms of misbehavior and generally overlooked "doing
nothing" as a basis for imposing liability. Id at comment (c). An exception to the rule has
been recognized when a special relationship exists between the defendant and plaintiff, and
further inroads are likely in instances involving "extreme cases of morally outrageous and
indefensible conduct." Id
18. 30 Cal. 3d at 369, 636 P.2d at 1127, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 789. " [Ilt becomes clear that
the traditional characterization of a defendant's failure to take affirmative steps to prevent a
natural condition from causing harm as nonactionable nonfeasance conflicts sharply with
modem perceptions of the obligations which flow from the possession of land." Id
19. 30 Cal. 3d at 370, 636 P.2d at 1127, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
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care can arise out of possession alone."20
The court buttressed this position by analogizing to its holding in

Rowland v. Christian,2" in which the supreme court abrogated the common law distinctions among a licensee, invitee, and trespasser as a basis

for assigning a duty to a possessor of land when a person on the land

suffers injury.2" The Sprecher court reasoned: "Modem cases recognize that after Rowland, the duty to take affirmative action for the pro-

tection of individuals coming upon the land is grounded in the
possession of the premises and the attendant right to control and manage the premises. 2 3
In following Rowland, the Sprecher court also emphasized the ap-

plicability of California Civil Code section 1714, which states that
"[e]veryone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but
also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or

skill in the management of his property or person .
held that a departure from this "fundamental concept.

*"24

. .

The court
is unwar-

ranted as regards natural conditions of land."25
To complete its analogy to the Rowland rationale, the Sprecher
court listed the factors delineated by the Rowland court to determine
when a possessor of land should be afforded immunity.2 6 The court
concluded that the applicability of those factors is neither diminished
20. Id at 367, 636 P.2d at 1126, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
21. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
22. Id at 118-19, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104. In Rowland, the plaintiff, a social
guest of the defendant, was injured by a faulty water faucet in the defendant's apartment.
The condition of the fixture was known to the defendant. The lower court granted summary
judgment for the defendant, relying on the common law rule that the only duty a possessor
owed a licensee was that of refraining from wanton or willful conduct. The supreme court
reversed, holding that an individual's status as a trespasser, a licensee, or an invitee was no
longer dispositive of the duty of care owed and was to be considered only as to the issue of
whether the possessor had exercised reasonable care under the circumstances. Id at 118-19,
443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
23. 30 Cal. 3d at 368, 636 P.2d at 1126, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
24. Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (West 1973 & Supp. 1983). For the Rowland court's discussion of the applicability of§ 1714, see 69 Cal. 2d at 112, 443 P.2d at 563-64, 70 Cal. Rptr. at
99-100.
25. 30 Cal. 3d at 371, 636 P.2d at 1128, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
26. Id at 370-71, 636 P.2d at 1128, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 790. The Rowland factors include
the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered
injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future
harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and the consequence to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise due care, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance.
69 Cal. 2d at 112-13, 443 P.2d at 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 100. The Sprecher court acknowledged that this last factor concerning insurance coverage may bear a relationship to the
artificial-natural condition distinction, as coverage may be difficult to obtain for some risks
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nor increased by the nature of the condition causing harm, whether
artificial or natural.27
The court cited Rogers v. Jones28 as an example of the "[m]odern
cases" decided subsequent to Rowland that have recognized that "the
duty to take affirmative action for the protection of individuals coming
upon the land is grounded in the possession of the premises and the
attendant right to control and manage the premises.1 29 The court also

noted that maintenance of the natural condition immunity rule after
Rowland would produce the anomalous situation in which a possessor

of land would have a duty of reasonable care to protect trespassers,
licensees, and invitees from risks of harm posed by a natural condition,
but would have no duty to his or her neighbor.3"

The Sprecher court also suggested that failure to abate a natural
condition might actually constitute a form of misfeasance. The court

drew upon a hypothetical case proposed by Professor Weinrib to illustrate that, in certain situations, what appears to be nonfeasance may
actually be misfeasance. 31 The example demonstrates that an individ-

ual may be burdened with a duty to exercise reasonable care if his or
her conduct aggravates an existing risk of harm to the victim: "Al-

though it may be nonfeasance to refuse to rescue a drowning person
whose predicament arose independently, it is misfeasance to hide the

rope that others might toss out to him."32 Using this reasoning, the
Sprecher court suggested that "by virtue of taking possession of a tract
of land, and thus preventing another from doing so, a possessor 'hides
the rope' that others might toss out to those outside the premises. That
is, his possession of [the] land. . . forestalls its possession by another
posed by natural conditions. The court held on balance, however, that departure from section 1714 was unwarranted. Id at 371, 636 P.2d at 1128, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
27. 30 Cal. 3d at 371, 636 P.2d at 1128, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
28. 56 Cal. App. 3d 346, 128 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1976).
29. 30 Cal. 3d at 368, 636 P.2d at 1126, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 788. To support this proposition, the court also cited O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp., 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142
Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977).
30. 30 Cal. 3d. at 370, 636 P.2d at 1128, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 790. Referring to the rule that
"a possessor of land is subject to liability for harm caused a person upon his land by a
natural condition," id (citing Austin v. Riverside Portland Cement Co., 44 Cal. 2d 225, 233,
282 P.2d 69, 73 (1955) (emphasis added)), the court declared, "[it] is difficult to see why this
court should support a rule which would allow a trespasser to bring an action in negligence
that would be denied a neighbor, where both were standing on either side of the possessor's
boundary line and were both struck by a dead limb from his tree." 30 Cal. 3d at 370, 636
P.2d at 1128, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
31. Id. at 370 n.8, 636 P.2d at 1127 n.8, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 789 n.8.
32. Id. (quoting Weinrib, supra note 4, at 258).
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who might abate the condition."3 3 Upon this basis, the court con-

cluded, "any unreasonable failure to abate would constitute
misfeasance."3 4
The Sprecher court perceived a judicial trend away from the natu-

ral condition immunity rule, stating that "[t]he erosion of the doctrinal
underpinning of the rule of nonliability is evident from even a cursory
review of the case law."35 The court cited cases from fifteen jurisdic-

tions which have recognized an exception to the rule for fallen trees
that cause injury, 6 and reasoned that the rationale for the tree exception applied to all natural conditions. 37 The court also cited section 840
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as evidence of the trend away

from the natural condition immunity rule and as support for the proposition that liability should not be limited to tree situations only, but

should include all dangerous natural conditions.38
The court also noted the widespread recognition of the landholder's duty to protect an adjoining landowner from a risk of harm

posed by a dangerous artqcialcondition, even if the original risk was
created by the possessor's predecessor in interest.39 The court stated

that this rule embraced the notion that a duty to exercise reasonable
care could arise even if the possessor's conduct could be characterized

as nonfeasance. 40 Assignment of a duty in this nonfeasance situation,
the court reasoned, indicated that the line between misfeasance and
30 Cal. 3d at 370 n.8, 636 P.2d at 1127 n.8, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 789 n.8.
Id
30 Cal. 3d at 371, 636 P.2d at 1128, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
Id at 364-65, 636 P.2d at 1124, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
Id at 365, 636 P.2d at 1124, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
The courts are not simply creating an exception to the common law rule of
nonliability for damage caused by trees and retaining the rule for other natural
conditions of the land. Instead, the courts are moving toward jettisoning the common law rule in its entirety and replacing it with a single duty of reasonable care in
the maintenance of property.
Id The Sprecher court cited no case in which the common law rule had been jettisoned in
its entirety.
38. Id at 365, 636 P.2d at 1124, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 786. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 840 (1977) states:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), a possessor of land is not liable to persons
outside the land for a nuisance resulting solely from a natural condition of the
land.
(2) A possessor of land who knows or has reason to know that a public nuisance
caused by natural conditions exists on his land near a public highway, is subject to
liability for failure to exercise reasonable care to prevent an unreasonable risk of
harm to persons using the highway.
39. 30 Cal. 3d at 369, 636 P.2d at 1127, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
40. Id
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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nonfeasance had already been crossed.'

Therefore, "the historical jus-

tification for the rule of nonliability for natural conditions has lost
whatever validity it may once have had."4 2

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

Possession Giving Rise to Duty

In holding that mere possession of land may give rise to a duty to

abate a dangerous condition thereon, whether the condition is natural
or artificial, the Sprecher court emphasized the principle that the duty

springs from the possessor's "right to control and manage the premises." 4 3 However, the court's abrogation of nonfeasance immunity in
Sprecher cannot be harmonized with this principle as it has been devel-

oped by the California courts and the legislature.'
1. Rowland v. Christian
The court's broad assertion that "after Rowland, the duty to take
affirmative action for the protection of individuals coming upon the
land is grounded in the possession of the premises and the attendant
right to control and manage the premises"4 suggests that the Rowland
41. Id (citing Weinrib, supra note 4, at 257).
42. 30 Cal. 3d at 370, 636 P.2d at 1128, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
43. Id at 368, 636 P.2d at 1126, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 788. The court did not expressly state
whether it considered possession of land containing a dangerous natural condition as a form
of misfeasance, other than to suggest the possible application of the "risk aggravation" principle to the Sprecher facts. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. However, a reasonable inference can be drawn from the court's language that it actually considered
possession of land to be misfeasance. The court stated:
Proponents of the rule of nonliability for natural conditions argued that a defendant's failure to prevent a natural condition from causing harm was mere nonfeasance. A natural condition of the land was by definition, they argued, one
which no human being had played a part in creating [citations omitted] ...
Whatever the rule may once have been, it is now clear that a duty to exercise
due care can arise out of possession alone.
30 Cal. 3d at 367, 636 P.2d at 1126, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 788. If the Sprecher court did, in fact,
consider the defendants' failure to abate the landslide condition as a form of misfeasance, it
created a fiction that defies the traditional criteria for distinguishing nonfeasance from misfeasance. Misfeasance exists when a defendant's conduct creates a risk of harm that threatens the plaintiff. See Weinrib, supra note 4, at 256. The risk of harm in the Sprecher
situation arose independently of the defendants' conduct. Because the parties agreed that no
human activity had caused the landslide to occur, see supra text accompanying note 13, the
only "conduct" attributable to the defendants was ownership and possession of the land.
Defendants' possession, however, did not create the risk of harm. The landslide condition in
Sprecher posed a threat to downhill property whether the land containing the landslide was
owned by defendants, third parties, or no one.
44. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
45. 30 Cal. 3d at 368, 636 P.2d at 1126, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
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court struck down all immunities afforded the landowner at common
law. This is inaccurate. The Sprecher court overlooked the distinction
between the common law immunity abrogated in Rowland and natural
condition immunity.
The issue resolved by the Rowland court was whether the possessor's duty to an individual on his property should be a function of that
individual's status.46 The Rowland court abrogated the common law
distinction among licensee, invitee and trespasser because these distinctions were "deeply rooted to the land" and could not be justified in an
"industrialized urban society."4 7 This lack of justification led to "complexity and confusion" for courts attempting to apply the distinctions. 8
Natural condition immunity, however, is rooted in the distinction
between nonfeasance and misfeasance. It can be rationalized, even in
modem times, by the need to distinguish between conduct that creates
a risk of harm and conduct that does not.49 The Rowland court did not
have occasion to address natural condition immunity or the policies
underlying it. Nonfeasance was not an issue in Rowland because the
condition causing injury was purely artificial." Furthermore, there
was a form of misfeasance involved in Rowland: the defendant had
participated in the risk creation, either by succeeding in possession 5 or
by allowing the condition to become dangerous.
Rowland's abrogation of one common law immunity offers little
justification for the assertion that all common law immunities are now
invalid. It offers even less justification for the abrogation of natural
condition immunity.
Moreover, the court's assertion that cases decided subsequent to
Rowland have recognized an affirmative duty grounded in possession
and control5 2 does not support the imposition of nonfeasance liability.
In Rogers v. Jones,5 3 cited by the Sprecher court to support the proposition that a duty can arise from possession and control of premises,5 4 the
court of appeal pointedly did not extend the possessor's duty to encom46. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
47. 69 Cal. 2d at 116, 443 P.2d at 566, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 102.
48. Id at 120, 443 P.2d at 569, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
49. See infra notes 91-102 and accompanying text.
50. 69 Cal. 2d at 110, 443 P.2d at 562, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 98. See supra note 22.
51. See 69 Cal. 2d at 111,443 P.2d at 563, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 99 and infra text accompanying notes 87-90.
52. 30 Cal. Rptr. at 368, 636 P.2d at 1126, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
53. 56 Cal. App. 3d 346, 128 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1976).
54. 30 Cal. 3d at 368, 636 P.2d at 1126, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
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pass nonfeasance situations." To the contrary, the Rogers court acknowledged that a landowner owed no duty to a person on his land
who was injured under circumstances described by the court as nonfea-

sance.

6

In Rogers, the plaintiff, who had attended a professional foot-

ball game, was injured when assaulted in a parking lot owned and
managed by the defendant. The court reasoned:
While. . . the occupier of land has a general duty to exercise ordinary care for the safety of persons who come upon

the property, he is not an insurer of their safety, and the duty
does not extend to controlling the misconduct of third persons
which he has no reason to 7anticipate and reasonable opportu5
nity or means to prevent.
The refusal of the Rogers court to hold the defendant landowner
liable has additional significance because the injury in Rogers, unlike
that in Sprecher, did not arise from pure nonfeasance; the defendant's

conduct in operating the parking lot arguably helped to create the inherent risk involved when "thousands of spectators abruptly descend[ed] upon" the lot. 8 Despite this relationship between conduct
and injury, the Rogers court refused to impose on the defendant an

affirmative duty based on his possession and control of the land. Rogers, therefore, does not support the imposition of such a duty on the
Sprecher defendants, who had not participated in the creation of the
dangerous natural condition that caused the damage. 9
55. 56 Cal. App. 3d at 351, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 407.
56. Id
57. Id (citations omitted). The plaintiff in Rogers had attempted to assist a private security officer who had been assaulted and knocked down by plaintiffs assailant. The trial
court awarded the plaintiff personal injury damages based on a finding that the defendant
had negligently failed to control the conduct of those on his premises. The court of appeal
reversed this judgment, holding that the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff to control
the unforeseeable misconduct of third persons. Id
58. Id
59. Although the Rogers court characterized the defendant's failure to control the acts of
a third person on his land as "nonfeasance," id, it has been suggested that this type of
conduct is best classified as "pseudo-nonfeasance." Professor Weinrib states:
The difference between real nonfeasance and pseudo-nonfeasance can be formulated by transforming the but-for [causation] test so that it attends not to the
actual injury but to the risk of injury ....
[B]ecause this formulation of the distinction focuses on the defendant's having
had some role in the creation of risk, and not the quality of that role, the defendant's fault in creating the risk is irrelevant whether a case is one of nonfeasance or
not.
Weinrib, supra note 4, at 254-55 (emphasis added). In Rogers, the important point is not
that the court may have misclassified the conduct as nonfeasance, but that the court recognized limitations on a possessor's duty when the relationship between the defendant's conduct and the risk of harm becomes substantially attenuated.
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2. Civil Code Section 1714
The Sprecher court's mechanical application of Civil Code section
1714,60 accompanied by the declaration that the Rowland factors did

not warrant departure from the section,61 confused further an unsettled
area of California tort law. It is well settled that "every case is gov-

erned by [section 1714's] rule of general application that all persons are
required to use ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as a
result of their conduct. '62 When a case involves nonfeasance, however,
it is not clear on what basis a court will decide whether departure from

section 1714 is justified. Two recent California Supreme Court cases
demonstrate this confusion.
In Weirum v. RKO General, Inc. ,63 the court suggested that in

cases of pure nonfeasance, immunity may be afforded without consideration of the Rowland factors.' In Tarasoffv.Regents of University of
60. See supra text accompanying notes 24-28.
61. See supra note 26.
62. Weirum v. RKO General, Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 46, 539 P.2d 36, 39, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468,
471 (1975) (citing Hilyar v. Union Ice Co., 45 Cal. 2d 30, 36, 286 P.2d 21, 24 (1955)).
63. 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975).
64. In Weirum, a wrongful death action was brought against the owner of a radio station
which had been sponsoring a contest rewarding the first listener to reach the location of one
of the station's disc jockeys. Plaintiff's decedent was killed when his automobile was negligently forced off a highway by an automobile driven by a contest participant. Id at 43, 539
P.2d at 37, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 469. The defendant radio station argued that it owed no duty to
the plaintiff because section 315 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS applied to the
case. Id at 48. 539 P.2d at 41, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 473. This section, based on nonfeasance
immunity, states:
There is no duty to control the conduct of a third person so as to prevent him from
causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to
the other a right of protection.
The Weirum court rejected the argument that section 315 afforded the defendant immunity:
As section 315 illustrates, liability for nonfeasance is largely limited to those circumstances inwhich some special relationship can be established. If, on the other
hand, the act complained of is one of misfeasance, the question of duty is governed
by the standards of ordinary care discussed above. [The court had earlier emphasized foreseeablity as the primary factor in determining the existence of a duty.]
Here, there can be little doubt that we review an act of misfeasance to which
section 315 is inapplicable.
15 Cal. 3d at 49, 539 P.2d at 41, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 473. Thus, the Weirum court suggested
that cases involving nonfeasance may be decided apart from section 1714 and the Rowland
factors.
See also Coffman v. Kennedy, 74 Cal. App. 3d 28, 141 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1977). In
Coffman, the plaintiff was injured when the car he was driving collided with another vehicle
operated by an intoxicated driver and in which the defendant was a passenger. The court of
appeal affirmed the portion of the trial court's ruling that held that the defendant owed no
duty to the plaintiff to control the conduct of the intoxicated driver, citing section 315 of the
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Caifornia,65 however, after finding the existence of a special relationship which rendered moot the question of nonfeasance immunity, the
court expressly declined to decide "whether foreseeability alone is sufficient to create a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect a potential
victim of another's conduct." 66
It is not clear whether the Sprecher court considered section 1714
and the Rowland factors because it deemed the Sprecher defendants'
conduct to constitute misfeasance, or whether the court implicitly extended the question left open in Tarasoff to encompass other nonfeasance situations as well (i.e. failure to abate dangerous natural
conditions on land) and then declared section 1714 and the Rowland
factors applicable in all nonfeasance contexts. This latter possibility
seems highly unlikely as the Sprecher court did not cite the Tarasoff
decision, nor did it discuss the foreseeability issue, other than to list it
as one of the Rowland factors.
B.

Mi easance: Aggravating the Risk by '"idingthe Rope"

The Sprecher court's suggestion that a landowner aggravates the
risk of harm posed by a dangerous natural condition because he forestalls possession of the land by another who may abate the condition67
is strained in several respects. First, possession of land by one who fails
to make safe a dangerous natural condition does not preclude the possibility that the condition will be corrected and the risk reduced. The
parties are free to negotiate an agreement concerning abatement of the
condition. The Sprecher court's analogy to Professor Weinrib's "hiding
of the rope" hypothetical is ill-conceived because the hypothetical involves an emergency situation in which contract values are suspended.
Negotiations with a drowning person regarding his rescue cannot result
in an enforceable contract because of the existence of duress.6 8 No
such suspension of contract values occurs when a natural landslide condition poses a risk of harm.6 9 If the condition poses an immediate and
as support. Id at 32-33, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 269. The Coffman court did not
consider the Rowland factors in affording the defendant nonfeasance immunity.
65. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). In Tarasoff, the court held
that a special relationship existed between a psychotherapist and his patient which gave rise
to a duty on the part of the psychotherapist to warn third parties of danger posed to them by
possible acts of the patient. Id at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
66. Id at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
67. 30 Cal. 3d at 370 n.8, 636 P.2d at 1127 n.8, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 789 n.8; see supra text
accompanying notes 31-34.
68. Weinrib, supra note 4, at 271-72.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 103-05.
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substantial threat to an individual's person or property and the landowner refuses to negotiate, the threatened individual may enjoy a privilege to enter the land and take self-help measures to abate the risk,
obligating himself to pay for damages caused to the landowner's
property.

70

The weakness of the court's reliance on the "hiding of the rope"
illustration is particularly apparent in light of the facts of Sprecher.
The independent risk of land movement posed by the natural landslide
condition had existed for hundreds, perhaps thousands, of years. 7' The
risk of landslide was not aggravated by the defendants' possession of
their 90-acre parcel. In fact, an argument can be advanced that plaintiff and his predecessors in interest aggravated the risk of harm by developing their property in the path of the landslide, thus setting the
stage for increased economic loss.
Finally, the court's analogy to the "hiding of the rope" illustration
fails because its logic ultimately depends upon characterizing the defendants' behavior while in possession of land as misfeasance. This
reasoning is unpersuasive. If such were the case, a "hiding of the rope"
argument could be made in cases such as Rogers v. Jones,72 where the
operator of the parking lot, although not legally responsible for the
conduct of third parties, nevertheless prevented the operation of the
parking lot by others who may have provided more safety measures
than were legally required. Theoretically, the court's reasoning would
sanction even more unlikely results, such as the argument that X's possession of a tract of land adjacent to property occupied by an indigent
individual in desperate need of surgery, but without funds to pay for it,
forestalls possession of the land by a benevolent person who would aid
the needy neighbor. The "aggravation" by X of the independently cre70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197, which recognizes this privilege, states in
pertinent part:
One is privileged to enter or remain on land in the possession of another if it is or
reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent serious harm to. . . the actor, or his
land .

.

.

Where the entry is for the benefit of the actor

. . .

he is subject to

liability for any harm done in the exercise of the privilege. . . to any legally protected interest of the possessor in the land ....
The reporter's notes for this section state that the privilege "permits the actor in a proper
case to enter the land and do reasonable acts upon it to prevent a threatened harm from
taking effect outside the land .... " Id
71. Defendants' brief at 2. One of the defendants' geologists testified at the hearing on
the motion for summary judgment that the natural slide condition "dates back thousands of
years" and may have "continued for millions of years." Id
72. 56 Cal. App. 3d 346, 128 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1976). See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
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ated risk of harm would, under the court's reasoning, impose on X a
tort duty to finance his neighbor's surgery.
The Sprecher defendants neither participated in the creation of the
risk of landslide, nor did they aggravate the danger posed by the natural landslide condition. In short, the Sprecher court failed to establish
that the defendants' conduct constituted misfeasance.
C Exceptions to the Rule: Imposition of Liabilityfor Nonfeasance

1. The tree exception
Numerous jurisdictions 73 and the Restatement (Second) of Torts7 4
have recognized an exception to the natural condition immunity rule
for trees on a landowner's property that fall and cause injury to others.
The exception first emerged in the early case of Gibson v. Denton, 5 in
which a decayed tree fell during a storm and damaged the home of an
adjoining landowner. The Gibson court likened the decayed tree to a
dangerous artificial condition, and noted that the tree "was as much
under the [owner's]76control as a pole or building in the same position
would have been."

The rationale underlying the tree exception focuses on the relative
ease of abating the danger presented by a decayed or otherwise dangerous tree. The burden imposed on the landowner by requiring him to
remedy the situation "is not large when compared with the increased
danger and potential for damages represented by the fall of such a
73. 30 Cal. 3d at 364-65, 636 P.2d at 1124, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 786. The Sprecher court

cited the following cases that have recognized the tree exception in other jurisdictions:
Husovsky v. United States, 590 F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Dudley v. Meadowbrook, Inc.,
166 A.2d 743 (D.C. Mun. App. 1961); Turner v. Ridley, 144 A.2d 269 (D.C. Mun. App.
1958); Carver v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 8 Ariz. App. 386, 446 P.2d 492 (1968),
vacated on othergrounds, 104 Ariz. 513, 456 P.2d 371 (1969); Cornett v. Agee, 143 Ga. App.
55, 237 S.E.2d 522 (1977); Mahurin v. Lockhart, 71 Ill. App. 3d 691, 390 N.E.2d 523 (1979);
Lemon v. Edwards, 344 S.W.2d 822 (Ky. 1961); Farbe v. Klein, 187 La. App. 467, (La.
1966); Hensley v. Montgomery County, 25 Md. App. 361, 334 A.2d 542 (1975); Kurtigian v.
City of Worcester, 348 Mass. 284, 203 N.E.2d 692 (1965); Rowe v. McGee, 5 N.C. App. 60,
168 S.E.2d 77 (1969); Hay v. Norwalk Lodge, B.P.O.E., 92 Ohio App. 14, 109 N.E.2d 481
(1951); Taylor v. Olsen, 282 Or. 343, 578 P.2d 779 (1978); Barker v. Brown, 236 Pa. Super.
75, 340 A.2d 566 (1975); Fabbri v. Regis Forcier, Inc., 114 R.I. 207, 330 A.2d 807 (1975);
Albin v. National Bank of Commerce of Seattle, 60 Wash. 2d 745, 375 P.2d 487 (1962).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 363(2) states:
A possessor of land in an urban area is subject to liability to persons using a public
highway for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
prevent an unreasonable risk of harm arising from the condition of trees on the
land near the highway.
75. 4 A.D. 198, 38 N.Y.S. 554 (1896).
76. Id. at -, 38 N.Y.S. at 555.
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tree."" Thus the courts have been particularly willing to recognize the

tree exception in urban areas where the dangerous tree threatens harm
to many people78 and in cases where the property the landowner must
inspect is not extensive.7 9

By the same token, the courts have been unwilling to invoke the
tree exception when the result would be the imposition of a broad and

burdensome duty based solely on the defendant's status as a possessor
of land. This consideration led the Kentucky Court of Appeals in
8 °
Lemon v. Edwards
to hold that the defendant had no duty to inspect
rural forest land for hazardous trees that lined seldom-used roads. 8'
In suggesting that the tree exception to the natural immunity rule
should be allowed to swallow the entire rule,8 2 the Sprecher court failed

to consider the exception's conceptual foundations. This enabled the
court to conclude that there was no substantial difference between the
nonfeasance involved in allowing a decayed or otherwise dangerous

tree to topple and cause injury, and that involved in failing to abate the
danger posed by the active landslide condition in Sprecher.
There are, however, significant differences between the two kinds
77. Barker v. Brown, 236 Pa. Super. 75, 81, 340 A.2d 566, 569 (1975); see also Mahurin
v. Lockhart, 71 Ill. App. 3d 691, 693, 390 N.E.2d 523, 524 (1979) (not "unduly burdensome"
for a small property owner to inspect his property for dangerous trees and take reasonable
precautions to prevent harm to those outside the land).
78. See, e.g., Kurtigian v. City of Worcester, 348 Mass. 284, 291, 203 N.E.2d 692, 696
(1965).
79. See, e.g., Mahurin v. Lockhart, 71 IM.App. 3d at 393, 390 N.E.2d at 524. In addition
to limiting the exception to situations in which users of public highways are injured by
falling trees, see supra text accompanying note 75, the RESTATEMENT confines the exception
to cases involving trees in urban areas. Comment (e) to section 363(2) states:
The rule stated in Subsection (2) is an exception [to the principle of nonliability for
harm caused by natural conditions] which has developed as to trees near a public
highway. It requires no more than reasonable care on the part of the possessor of
the land to prevent an unreasonable risk of harm to those in the highway, arising
from the condition of the trees. In an urban area, where traffic is relatively frequent, land is less heavily wooded, and acreage is small, reasonable care for the
protection of travelers on the highway may require the possessor to inspect all trees
which may be in such dangerous condition as to endanger travelers. It will at least
require him to take reasonable steps to prevent harm when he is in fact aware of
the dangerous condition of the tree.
80. 344 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Ky. 1961).
81. See also Albin v. National Bank of Commerce of Seattle, 60 Wash. 2d 745, 375 P.2d
487 (1962), where the court refused to assign liability to a county government which had no
actual notice of a decayed tree that had fallen and killed a traveller on a rural road over
which the county had maintenance responsibility. The court reasoned it would not be feasible to impose a duty on the county to discover dangerous trees: "[Tihis is neither practicable
nor desirable. The financial burden would be unreasonable, in comparison with the risk
involved." Id at 749, 375 P.2d at 489.
82. 30 Cal. 3d at 365, 636 P.2d at 1124, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
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of nonfeasance. A dangerous tree presents an immediate risk of harm
to any property or person within its zone of danger. Although a duty
assigned to abate the risk caused by a dangerous tree is grounded in
nonfeasance, the duty is easily confined. The materialization of immediate harm is foreseeable and the risk is inexpensive to diagnose; it requires no sophisticated scientific evaluation to determine that a tree is

dangerous. The hazardous condition can thus be alleviated with little
inconvenience or cost to the possessor of land on which the tree

stands.8 3
On the other hand, a landslide condition like that present in
Sprecher poses more complex problems. It cannot be remedied with a
chainsaw. An attempt to remedy the condition in Sprecher would have
entailed corrective action on numerous properties along the entire
width of the landslide area. 4 Furthermore, a geologist for the defendants testified that a necessary investigatory study of the slide area
would have cost approximately $100,000.15

Defendants would have

been obliged to incur this expense prior to taking any corrective action.
The Sprecher court failed to consider the extensive burdens the
defendants would face if a duty were imposed upon them. That failure
signifies a radical departure from the principles enunciated in the tree
exception cases cited by the Sprecher court in support of its holding. 6
83. See Weinrib, supra note 4. A parallel situation, the common law's refusal to recognize a duty to rescue an imperiled person, illustrates the need to limit the duty imposed in a
nonfeasance context. Professor Weinrib argues that neither economic nor philosophic foundations of the common law should preclude a court-imposed affirmative duty to rescue when
an emergency exists and the rescuer can act with little inconvenience to himself. Id at 250.
In advancing his argument for a judicially recognized duty to rescue, however, he does not
argue for complete abandonment of nonfeasance immunity principles. Such abandonment
would necessarily result in the imposition of a general duty to come to the aid of others in
need. Rather, Professor Weinrib carefully restricts the types of situations in which a duty to
rescue would be imposed. The duty would arise only in emergency situations when the
rescuer could effect the rescue without significant cost to himself. Id at 256. These two
restrictions-emergency situations and insignificant burden on the rescuer-embrace fundamental notions about the separation of contract values and tort obligations. Professor
Weinrib, by thus narrowly confining his proposed duty, seeks to avoid the immense legal
and economic problems that would arise if a general duty to aid others were recognized.
These problems would include: encouragement of officious intermeddling; discouragement
of beneficience, because the obscuring of the distinction between the praiseworthy and the
required would reduce stimuli for persons to be beneficient; and the fact that legally enforced altruism would be self-defeating because "any potential recipient of aid would himself be an altruist, who must accordingly subordinate the pursuit of his own projects to the
rendering of aid to others." Id at 281-82.
84. 30 Cal. 3d at 374, 636 P.2d at 1130, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 792 (Richardson, J.,
concurring).
85. Defendants' brief at 10.
86. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
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Artificial conditions and nonfeasance

A landowner who succeeds in interest to property which contains a
dangerous artificial condition is liable to adjoining property owners for
damages caused by the condition even though he did not participate in
the creation of the original risk of harm.8 7 From this rule, the Sprecher
court drew the conclusion that maintenance of a distinction between

artificial and natural conditions on land is meaningless because the
boundary separating misfeasance and nonfeasance has already been
crossed.8
In reality, however, the boundary has not been crossed because the

liability of a successor in interest for injury occasioned by an artificial
condition involves misfeasance, not nonfeasance. The misfeasancenonfeasance distinction is relevant to whether a duty is created; it is not
relevant to whether a duty, once created, can be assumed by or assigned to another party. If a previously existing duty is assumed by an

individual who played no part in the creation of the risk of harm which
gave rise to the duty, that individual must discharge the duty in a reasonable fashion or negligence will result. 9

In the case of a dangerous artificial condition, a duty is assumed
by the person who succeeds in title to the land containing the condi-

tion.9" The assumption of an already existing duty with potential lia87. See supra text at notes 39-42. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 366 sets
forth the rule:
One who takes possession of land upon which there is an existing structure or other
artificial condition unreasonably dangerous to persons or property outside of the
land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the condition after,
but only after,
(a) the possessor knows or should know of the condition, and
(b) he knows or should know that it exists without the consent of those affected by it, and
(c) he has failed, after reasonable opportunity, to make it safe or otherwise to
protect such persons against it.
It is interesting to note that subsection (b) exculpates a possessor from liability if the
threatened landowner consented to the risk posed by the artificial condition. Assuming arguendo that the Sprecher court correctly maintained that the principles in section 366 should
apply to natural conditions as well, the court failed to address the possibility that the plaintiff had consented to the risk posed by the landslide condition in that he purchased his
property with notice of the threat.
88. 30 Cal. 3d at 369-70, 636 P.2d at 1127, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
89. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 343. Prosser states:
When we cross the line into the field of "misfeasance," liability is far easier to find.
A truck driver may be under no obligation whatever to signal to a car behind him
that it may safely pass; but if he does signal, he will be liable if he fails to exercise
proper care and injury results.
90. See PROSSER, supra note 1, at 414. "The vendee to whom possession is transferred
becomes himself an occupier, and subject to all of the obligations of a possessor."
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bility for its breach contrasts sharply with the Sprecher situation, in
which defendants had succeeded in interest to property containing only
a dangerous natural condition. In Sprecher, because no common law
duty of care ever existed to burden the property, there was no duty for
the successor in interest to assume. There was no misfeasance, so the
rationale for assigning a duty to the successor in interest does not
apply.
C

The Basis of Nonfeasance Immunity

The law of torts is predicated upon the realization that not all relationships in our society can be governed by statute or contract law. 9 1
The existence of a tort duty is "an expression of the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular
plaintiff is entitled to protection." 92
Nonfeasance immunity embraces the notion that there exists no
general tort duty of beneficence. 93 This notion reflects the elevated
status that individual liberty enjoys in the legal system. Individuals are
not compelled to confer benefits on others based upon the utilitarian
ideal that such action should be taken whenever the cost of conferring
the benefit is less than the value of the benefit conferred. If such action
were compelled, individual liberty would be severely undermined. 94
As Professor Epstein has observed:
Once one decides that as a matter of statutory or common law
duty, an individual is required under some circumstances to
act at his own cost for the exclusive benefit of another, then it
is very hard to set out in a principled manner the limits of
social interference with individual liberty.95
91. Id. at 5-6.
92. Id at 325-26.
93. See F. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS 293-95 (1926):
There is no distinction more deeply rooted in the common law and more fundamental than that between misfeasance and non-feasance ....
In the case of active misfeasance the victim is positively worse off as a result of
the wrongful act. In cases of [nonfeasance] plaintiff is in reality no worse off at all.
His situation is unchanged; he is merely deprived of a protection which, had it
been afforded him, would have benefited him. . . . [B]y failing to interfere in the
plaintiff's affairs, the defendant has left him just as he was before; no better off, it is
true, but still in no worse position; he has failed to benefit him, but he has not
caused him any new injury nor created any new injurious situation.
See also Weinrib, supra note 4, at 268-79, and Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.
LEGAL STUD. 151, 200-01 (1973).

94. See supra note 83.
95. Epstein, supra note 93, at 198. Professor Epstein states that "the first task of the law
of torts is to define the boundaries of individual liberty." Id at 203. He goes much further
in recognition of the validity of nonfeasance immunity than does Professor Weinrib. See
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Abrogation of nonfeasance immunity should address the concern
that it be accomplished in a principled fashion. This can be done by
focusing on the extent to which a nonfeasance duty encroaches on individual liberty, and whether the duties and rights at issue can be effectively assigned by contract rather than tort law.
Assuming that contract law "provides the principal embodiment in
the law of individual liberty,"9 6 nonfeasance tort duties which impinge
upon contract values necessarily impinge on individual liberty.9 7 That
tort duties and contract values overlap in certain kinds of transactions
is not remarkable; the problem concerns the extent of the interference
with individual liberty when tort duties are imposed in nonfeasance
situations, because by definition exchanges in this context are compelled when the duty-laden defendant has in no way participated in the
creation of the risk of harm.98 Conversely, in situations where contract
values do not exist and a duty can be imposed on the defendant that is
not unduly burdensome, imposition of such a duty will not significantly
impair individual liberty. This is the basis of the argument for recognition of an affirmative duty to rescue an imperiled person. 99
When negotiation of an enforceable contract between parties situated in a nonfeasance context is possible, refraining from imposing a
burdensome tort duty not only protects individual liberty, it also serves
to advance economic efficiency. l00 When transaction costs are not high
supra note 83. Epstein posits that principles of causation and volition, not principles of duty
and reasonableness, should determine tort liability. Id. at 203-04. Consequently, Epstein
opposes any legally enforceable duty on one to effectuate a rescue, even in the presence of
emergency and lack of inconvenience to the rescuer. Id at 199.
96. Weinrib, supra note 4, at 268.
97. Once [nonfeasance-based] forced exchanges ... are accepted, it will no longer
be possible to delineate the sphere of activities in which contract ... will be required in order to procure desired benefits and the sphere of activity in which those
benefits can be procured as of right.
Epstein, supra note 93, at 199.
98. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 83. Professor Weinrib distinguishes the duty he proposes from the
broader duty of beneficence which he acknowledges would greatly undermine contractual
values:
In the rescue context, the resource to be expended (time and effort directed at aiding the victim) cannot be traded on the market .... In the charity context, by
contrast, the resource to be expended (money) can be traded on the market ....
Weinrib, supra note 4, at 272.
100. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J.LEGAL STUD. 205, 219 (1973). Professor
Posner notes that:
There is no occasion for compelling transactions where negotiations are feasible
.... [A] system of liability that coerced people into performing services in circumstances where negotiations between them and the beneficiaries of the services
were possible would be economically unsound.
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the legal system is inferior to market transactions in allocating resources because the market can more efficiently value competing
uses.'' In the market, individuals must substantiate their claims as to
value with money, while often claims as to value made in court are less

trustworthy.

02

Nonfeasance immunity, therefore, embraces the value of individual liberty and recognizes that economic efficiency can best be served

by market transactions. The impact of nonfeasance liability on these
factors should be carefully considered before abrogating the immunity.
D.

Sprecher Nonfeasance Liability

The Sprecher court abrogated an area of nonfeasance immunity
without regard for the protection of individual liberty or the promotion
of economic efficiency. An emergency situation such as that present
when a person is drowning did not exist. The risk of harm did not
develop rapidly and without warning; the landslide condition "[had]
10 3
been evident since the area was first developed in the early 1900's."'
These factors contrast markedly with a rescue situation and indicate
that contract values were not suspended; negotiations between the parties were possible."°4 Furthermore, unlike a rescue situation, the benefit conferred in Sprecher-theplaintiff's increased property value-can
be traded on the market. 0 5 These considerations, in addition to the
Professor Posner rejects Epstein's contention that there is no logical stopping point in imposing an affirmative duty on an individual in order to induce him to benefit another, and
notes that a rescue situation is one such stopping point. Posner argues that in a rescue
situation transaction costs are so high that imposition of an affirmative duty on a potential
rescuer is justified. "[W]hen I see a flower pot about to fall on someone's head I cannot
pause to negotiate with him over an appropriate fee for warning him .... Id The social
benefits accruing from the saving of a life or avoiding injury would generally exceed the
costs to the rescuer, and efficiency would thereby be served by inducing such a rescue. Id at
218-19.
Posner, however, has also argued that imposing a duty to rescue would not necessarily
promote economic efficiency. He suggests, as an example, that if a duty to rescue were
recognized, strong swimmers might avoid crowded beaches, or persons might lose incentive
to become strong swimmers in the first place. Additionally, an imposed duty to rescue
would diminish the incentive to rescue held by altruists. The number of rescues by altruists
might therefore be reduced. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 132 (1977).
101. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 399-404 (1977).
102. See Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 76-77:
If I testify in a negligence suit that the loss of my little finger was a source of
unbearable psychological agony, for which $100,000 would barely compensate me,
I am likely to be disbelieved; not so if I refuse a bona fide offer of $ 100,000 for my
little finger.
103. 30 Cal. 3d at 361, 636 P.2d at 1122, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 784.
104. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 99.
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burdensome nature of the duty imposed by the Sprecher court,10 6 suggest that the court sanctioned a significant encroachment on individual
liberty.
Because negotiations were feasible and transaction costs would not
be high, efficiency would best be served by the market, not the legal
system, in allocating the resources at issue in Sprecher.'0 7 This factor
also discredits the Sprecher court's invocation of section 840 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 0 8 as authority supporting its holding. Section 840, in recognizing the duty of a possessor of land to protect
persons traveling on public highways from all natural conditions on his
land, recognizes the prohibitive transaction costs that would arise if
such a traveller were forced to negotiate a safety agreement with each
possessor of land along his route.
The ultimate position that Sprecher mandates is a substantial
transfer of wealth from landowners whose property contains dangerous
natural conditions to landowners threatened by those conditions. The
following table illustrates hypothetically this forced exchange, and
demonstrates the argument'0 9 that such decisions as to resource allocation can best be handled consensually by contract. The table is based
on the assumption that failure to abate the dangerous condition would
subject the uphill landowner to liability if he owed a duty of reasonable
care to the downhill owner.

Uphill Value
with DNCO0
$90,000

Pre-Sprecher
Uphill Value with Downhill Value Downhill Value Cost to
DNC abated
before abatement with DNC abated abate
$100,000
(less share of

$60,000

abatement cost)

$100,000
(less share of

$30,000

abatement cost)

Post-Sprecher
$50,000

$100,000
(less $30,000
abatement cost)

$100,000

$100,000

$30,000

Before Sprecher, the uphill property value with the unabated dangerous natural condition reflects the probability that some devaluation
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See supra text accompanying notes 84-86.
See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
Dangerous Natural Condition.
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will take place if a landslide occurs. Hence, the uphill property value is
increased if the landslide condition is abated. Similarly, the downhill
property value, prior to the taking of corrective measures on the uphill
parcel, reflects the risk of harm posed by the landslide condition. Because the total increase in property value that would result if the condition were abated ($50,000) exceeds the cost of abatement, the efficient
solution would be for the parties to negotiate an agreement dividing the
$30,000 needed to correct the condition. Obviously, the uphill owner
should be able to obtain an agreement whereby he pays substantially
less of the abatement cost than the downhill owner. Because the incentive for the downhill owner to have the condition corrected is high, the
focus of negotiations would be how much less than $10,000 (the uphill
owner's gain after abatement) the uphill owner would have to pay. An
agreement should be reached that increases both the combined value of
the two properties and the value of each individual property. The important point is that transaction costs for the parties to negotiate this
agreement are low, and no one is in a better position than the parties to
determine the relevant factors surrounding their negotiations and
agreement (or lack of agreement)."'
As a result of Sprecher, the uphill owner must now decide whether
he will compensate the downhill owner through abatement of the condition or through the legal system if the risk materializes and causes
damage. The uphill owner should expend $30,000 to correct the condition (assuming the probability of realization of the risk is high) because
this would cost less than compensation after the damage. If compensation is sought after the damage is done, as was the case in Sprecher,
transaction costs are greatly increased by resort to the legal system. By
abating the risk, the uphill owner would spend $30,000 for a gain of
$10,000 in property value, for a net loss of $20,000. Yet, under the
Sprecher rule, this is the rational course of action for him to follow. If
the uphill owner waited until after the downhill owner was damaged he
would be obligated to pay $40,000 (assuming the pre-abatement values
accurately represent the amount of damage actually caused by the condition, and the trier of fact actually arrives at this same damage figure),
and additionally would not realize the $10,000 of his possible increased
property value. If the uphill owner pursues the economically rational
course and abates the risk, thereby taking the net loss, society will benefit from an increase in total property value, but that benefit will have
111. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
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been exclusively at the expense of the uphill owner, who suffers substantial economic loss.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Sprecher court substantially realigned property rights, which
will result in forced exchanges of wealth, notwithstanding the significant encroachment on liberty caused by such realignment and the desirability of effectuating such exchanges consensually. The holding has
both practical and conceptual implications.
From a practical perspective, transaction costs underlying disputes
between landowners are likely to increase dramatically. The imposition of aper se duty on landowners will have the effect of converting
heretofore market transactions into legal transactions. A landowner
who alleges damage from any type of condition on an adjoining property will henceforth be entitled to have a trier of fact determine whether
the duty had been reasonably discharged by the possessor of the adjoining property. Plainly, litigating whether a duty has been breached
is likely to be more costly than deciding only whether a duty existed.
For example, an owner of forested land may need to defend before a
trier of fact the reasonableness of his failure to take corrective action
when lightning strikes a tree on his land, starts a forest fire and damages adjoining property.
Conceptually, the Sprecher holding raises issues as to what standard, if any, the court will apply when abrogating nonfeasance immunity. The court's failure to address the primary concerns expressed by
scholars and in case law-the burden of imposing a duty on the landowner, whether contract values exist, and transaction costs-suggests
that the court has yet to formulate a principled basis for imposing nonfeasance liability.
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